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The Precautionary Principle and
Radiation Protection
Kenneth L. Mossman & Gary E. Marchant*

Introduction
Over the past decade, the precautionary principle has been
incorporated into an ever-increasing number of international
agreements and domestic statutes. Essentially, the precautionary
principle states that when an activity or technology may harm human
health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even
if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established
scientifically. The precautionary principle remains vague and ill-defined
notwithstanding its widespread use. While there have been some
attempts to better define and "operationalize" the precautionary
principle, most notably by the European Commission, substantial
ambiguity remains about the applicability and requirements of the
precautionary principle. One approach to better clarify and evaluate the
precautionary principle is to examine its application to specific health
and environmental problems, and perhaps just as importantly to
consider cases where the principle does not apply. Control of ionizing
radiation provides a useful case study for studying the application and
meaning of the precautionary principle. 1
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I
Discussion is limited to the radiation protection of humans. Ionizing radiation refers to
particulate and high energy electromagnetic radiation including alpha and beta particles,
neutrons, x-rays, and gamma rays. Ultraviolet light, microwaves, and electromagnetic radiation
associated with electric power generation are not considered ionizing radiation because they
have insufficient energy per photon to cause ionization when absorbed.
*
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The PrecautionaryPrinciple
The precautionary principle is often summarized by the phrase
"better safe than sorry." 2 It requires foregoing, postponing, or
otherwise limiting a product or activity until uncertainty about its
potential risks have been resolved in favor of safety. Over the past
decade, the precautionary principle has been incorporated into a series
of international environmental agreements. Perhaps most prominently
known is the 1992 United Nations Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development, which states: "Where there are threats of serious and
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation." 3 Various formulations of the precautionary principle
have also been adopted into other international agreements including:
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Delete the Ozone Layer, the
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, and the recent agreement on
Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs).
Europe has been at the forefront of adopting the precautionary
principle. The European Community formally committed to
implementing environmental policy in conformity with the
precautionary principle with the 1992 Maastricht Amendments to the
European Community Treaty. Individual European nations, most
notably Germany and the Scandinavian nations, have selectively begun
to implement the precautionary principle in their national regulatory
programs, as have various non-European nations including Australia and
Canada.
As presently formulated, the precautionary principle is ill-defined
and vague. There is no standard definition of the precautionary
principle, and the many versions that do exist are inconsistent on
important aspects. 4 For example, compare the language of the Rio
2
The Hippocratic Oath offers another interpretation of the precautionary principle. The
oath instructs physicians to "prescribe regimen for the good of my patients according to my

ability and my judgment and never do harm to anyone."
3

United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on

Environment and Development (United Nations 1992).
4

Per Sandin, Dimensions of the Precautionary Principle, 5 Human and Ecological Risk
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Declaration cited above with the version put forward as a consensus
statement by many proponents of the precautionary principle known as
the Wingspread Statement which states that "[w]hen an activity raises
threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary
measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are
not fully established scientifically." 5 The precautionary principle
adopted by the Rio Declaration applies only to "serious and
irreversible" risks, whereas the version provided by the Wingspread
Statement is not limited to any subset of risks. The Rio Declaration
requires any action taken under the precautionary principle to be costeffective, while the Wingspread Statement makes no mention of
economic considerations. The Rio Declaration is stated in the negative,
in that uncertainty should not preclude preventive action, whereas the
Wingspread Statement imposes an affirmative obligation to act
notwithstanding uncertainty.
These and many other inconsistencies between the many different
versions of the precautionary principle are compounded by the
ambiguity in any specific formulation of the precautionary principle.
No version of the precautionary principle is clear on when the
precautionary principle applies, and, just as importantly, when the
principle does not apply.
There remains many unanswered questions, among them includes
whether the principle is triggered by the magnitude of a risk, the
uncertainty associated with that risk, or some combination of both
magnitude and uncertainty? How much of each is necessary to trigger
the principle? If the principle applies only to "serious" or "irreversible"
risks, how are such risks defined? If the principle is not so limited to
serious or irreversible risks, how can the principle be applied in a
principled and feasible manner given that every product presents some
risks in some scenarios? What quantum of evidence is necessary to
establish the necessary magnitude of risk and/or uncertainty? Can the
unsubstantiated fears of one or more persons trigger the principle? Or
Assessment 889 (1999).
5
Carolyn Raffensperger et al., Protecting Public Health and the Environment:
Implementing the PrecautionaryPrinciple (Island Press 1999) (alteration in original).
13 Risk. Health, Safety & Environment 137 [Spring 2002]

does the suspicion of a potential risk have to be supported by credible
scientific evidence? What if there is some scientific evidence of a
potential risk, but the total body of available evidence weighs against
the existence of a significant risk? Who makes the decision regarding
whether the evidence is sufficient to meet the standard for triggering
the principle? What types of "precautionary measures" should be taken
when a sufficient threat exists? Should the precautionary measures be
proportional to the magnitude of the "threat?" If the precautionary
principle requires blocking development of a product until sufficient
safety data pertaining to that product is available, what is required
before the product is permitted to move forward? If the available
evidence indicates the potential existence of some risk, what level of
risk, if any, is acceptable to allow the product to proceed? What factors
can be considered in determining whether the product should or should
not go forward? For example, can the economic benefits of the product
be considered? Are the health and safety benefits of products
considered?
These unanswered questions create substantial uncertainty about the
applicability and requirements of the precautionary principle to any
given risk. The European Union (EU) has made the most concerted
attempt to try and reduce some of these uncertainties and provide
some concrete guidance regarding the application and meaning of the
precautionary principle. In particular, the twenty-nine page
Communication on the precautionary principle issued by the European
Commission (EC) in February 2000 provides the most detailed
6
guidelines on the precautionary principle to date.
The EC Communication provides some guidance on when recourse
to the precautionary principle is triggered. The Communication defines
the precautionary principle as a risk management tool which is to be
applied only after a scientific evaluation of the available risk data (i.e.,
risk assessment). The Communication describes two outputs from this
risk assessment that are necessary to justify recourse to the
6
European Commission, Communication for the
Principle (2000).

Commission on the Precautionary
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precautionary principle. The risk assessment must identify potentially
negative effects resulting from the product or activity, and the available
scientific data must be so insufficient, inconclusive, or imprecise to
make it impossible to "determine with sufficient certainty the risk in
question." A "political decision" is then required to determine whether
any precautionary action is appropriate, which is largely a function "of
the risk level that is 'acceptable' to the society in which the risk is
7
imposed."
If the precautionary principle does apply to a risk, the
Communication describes a series of five general principles that should
govern application of the principle. First, the principle of
proportionality should apply, which requires the chosen risk reduction
measure to be proportional to the seriousness of the potential risk, and
should include less restrictive alternatives that achieve the desired level
of protection. Second, the principle of non-discrimination which
requires that risk reduction measures not be discriminatory in their
application, and thus comparable situations should not be treated
differently. Third, the principle of consistency requires risk reduction
measures to be consistent with the measures already adopted in similar
circumstances. Fourth, the costs and benefits of action and lack of
action should be examined, including an economic cost/benefit analysis
when this is "appropriate and feasible." Finally, precautionary measures
should be provisional, they should be reevaluated and, if necessary,
modified with the development of scientific knowledge.
These principles are themselves largely general and vague in nature,
and do not provide rigorous and precise definitions for when the
precautionary principle should apply and what the principle should
require when it does apply. Nevertheless, the EC Communication
provides the most detailed and authoritative guidance to date on the
application of the precautionary principle. Further clarity on the
precautionary principle may require evaluation of its potential relevance
to specific environmental or health threats. Control of ionizing
radiation exposure provides such a case study for examining the
applicability and limits of the precautionary principle.
7

Id.
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Applicability of the Precautionary Principle to Radiation Protection
The precautionary principle is implicit in existing radiation safety
practice but is not explicitly required. The International Commission
on Radiological Protection supports a precautionary approach to
radiological protection by arguing that even small radiation doses may
produce some deleterious health effects 8 although there is little direct
evidence to support this view as discussed below. In practice, an "as low
as reasonably achievable" (ALARA) philosophy is used to minimize
radiation doseage in occupational and environmental settings with
appropriate considerations for social and economic costs. When used
appropriately, the ALARA philosophy balances the public health goal of
maintaining doses as low as possible against economic and other costs
of achieving specific dose targets.
Is a more stringent approach to radiation protection premised on
the precautionary principle necessary and appropriate? Ionizing
radiation does not meet the criteria identified by the EC
Communication for recourse to the precautionary principle. In the first
place, the existing scientific database for radiation lack the requirements
identified by the EC for triggering application of the precautionary
principle. To the contrary, ionizing radiation is one of the most
thoroughly studied human carcinogens. Health effects of radiation at
occupational and environmental doses are well-known. Over fifty years
of human epidemiology experience strongly supports the notion that
doses below about 100 mSv and are not associated with significant
radiogenic risks in adult populations. Health effects data at doses below
9
about 100 mSv are available from a number of published studies.
Selected epidemiological studies are listed in Table 1. These studies
examined mortality from leukemias and all other forms of cancer.
Elevated radiogenic risks were not detected at statistically significant
levels.
8
International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), 1990 Recommendations
of the International Commission on Radiological Protection, ICRP Publication 60 (Elsevier
Science 1991).
9
United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, Sources and
Effects of Ionizing Radiation UNSCEAR 2000 Report to the General Assembly (vith
Scientific Annex) (United Nations 2000).
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In adult populations, the lowest dose associated with significant
radiogenic risk is 200 mSv. In children, the lowest dose associated with
radiogenic cancer is approximately 100 mSv for thyroid cancer based
on a pooled analysis of seven studies. These doses do not represent
thresholds but reflect statistical limitations of radioepidemiological
studies. 10 A recent analysis of atomic bomb survivor data from 1950
to 1990 suggested that the dose-response curve for cancer mortality is
linear down to 50 mSv, which is the lowest dose linked to a statistically
significant radiogenic risk.1 1 However, in other independent analyses
of the life span study data, a curvilinear dose-response also provided a
satisfactory fit to the Japanese data1 2 and, using different analytical
methods, no evidence for increased tumor rates below 200 mSv was
found. 13
Risks from low doses of radiation are very difficult to detect in
epidemiological studies because of the large background rate of cancer
and the fact that radiogenic cancers are clinically indistinguishable from
cancers that arise from most other causes. Figure 1 illustrates the
4
magnitude of the problem. For a radiogenic risk of 5 x 10(corresponding to a dose of 10 mSv and a lifetime radiogenic risk of
5%/Sv), power is 6% for a population of 0.1 million, 17% for a
population of I million, and 90% for a population of 10 million. For a
radiogenic lifetime risk of 5 x 10- 3 (corresponding to a dose of 100
mSv), power is 90% for a population of 0.1 million, and 100% for a
population of I million or larger.

10 Kenneth L. Mossman, The Linear No-Threshold Debate: Where Do We Go From
Here?, 25 Medical Physics 279 (1998).
11 Donald Pierce et al., Studies of the Mortality of Atomic Bomb Survivors: Report 12, Part
1. Cancer: 1950-1990, 146 Radiation Research 1 (1996).
12 Mark P. Little & Colin Muirhead, Evidence for Curvilinearity in the Cancer Incidence
Dose-Response in the Japanese Atomic Bomb Survivors, 70 Int. Journal of Radiation Biology
83 (1996).
13 W.F. Heidenreich et al., No Evidence for Increased Tumor Rates Below 200 mSv in the
Atomic Bomb Survivors Data, 36 Radiation Env. Biophys 206, 207 (1997).
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Table 1 14
Selected Large Epidemiological Studies Involving
Radiation Delivered at Low Dose or Low Dose-Rate

Population

Studya
Nuclear workers
in Japan (mortality)

Mean Dose

Type of Exposure

Person-yearsb

114,900
(all male)

14 mSv

Nuclear power plants, fuel
reprocessing, research facilities

Nuclear workers in
95,673
Canada, UK, US (85% male)
(mortality)

40 mSv

Nuclear power plants, fuel
2,124,526
reprocessing, research facilities

Hanford Workers
(mortality)

32,643
(76% male)

26 mSv

Nuclear fuel cycle, research

Yangjiang, China
(mortality)

89,694
(50% male)
(all ages)

6.4 mSv/y

Continuous background
radiation

533,168

633,511
1,698,350

aLeukemias and all other cancers were studied in these investigations. No statistically significant
radiogenic risks were found.
bperson-years is a product of the number of people in the polpulation study and the average
time of observations. The result is a measure of popluation size and years of observation.
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Figure 1: Power Curves
Statistical power to detect an increased risk of cancer in
epidemiological studies for population sizes of 0.1, 1, and 10 million
14

Id.
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are shown. Power is the probability (in percent) that the given lifetime
radiogenic risk will be detected. One hundred percent power means
that the risk, if present, is detected all of the time. Power curves were
generated using NCSS Statistical Software (Kaysville, UT 84037)
assuming a baseline lifetime cancer mortality rate of 20% and a error
of 5%.
Although low dose and low dose-rate epidemiological studies with
large populations may have sufficient statistical power to detect
radiogenic risks, the use of low doses makes a clear demonstration of
radiation effects difficult. Other factors including the "healthy worker
effect," 15 contributions of possible confounding influences of
chemicals and other toxic agents in the workplace, accuracy of dose
assessment, mortality follow-up, and various lifestyle factors (e.g.,
smoking histories) may also cloud the interpretation of data on
radiogenic risk. 16 Notwithstanding these uncertainties, the scientific
database is sufficiently rich and robust to guide policy decisions
without recourse to the precautionary principle.
Perhaps even more critical to the issue of whether the precautionary
principle should apply to ionizing radiation is the question of acceptable
risk. As discussed above, the EC Communication states that the
precautionary principle should only be triggered by risks with the
potential to impose unacceptable risks. This inquiry necessitates
establishing a level of risk that is acceptable (or perhaps trivial), below
which neither regulatory intervention nor the precautionary principle is
warranted.
The ALARA philosophy for ionizing radiation evolved from the
linear no-threshold (LNT) theory that has, for many years, served as a
basis for radiation protection practice and regulatory decision-making.
The theory predicts that any dose of radiation, no matter how small,
might cause cancer. Unfortunately, this has been interpreted to mean
15 The "healthy worker effect" (HWE) is a form of selection bias in epidemiological studies
where two or more groups of individuals are compared for disease. HWE allows relatively
healthy people to become or remain workers whereas non-workers (including those who are
retired, disabled, or who remain unemployed) are less healthy as a group. Workers probably
have a minimum level of health to remain employed whereas the general population includes
everyone sick or healthy.
16 See United Nations Scientific Committee, supran. 9.
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that there is no safe dose of radiation. However, any residual risks
remaining after a prudent application of the existing ALARA policy
would likely be in the acceptable risk range.
These arguments suggest that an application of the precautionary
principle is neither necessary nor appropriate for radiation protection
given existing protections and policies in place. Even if the
precautionary principle were applicable to ionizing radiation, many of
the actions based explicitly or implicitly on the precautionary principle
are inconsistent with the policies in the EC Communication governing
application of the principle. For example, the principles of
proportionality and cost-benefit evaluation argue against regulatory
action for very low radiation exposures. This guidance appears
inconsistent with some extreme and inappropriate applications of
ALARA (premised on the precautionary principle) in which doses are
reduced to the lowest levels possible (if not zero) with little, if any,
benefit-cost considerations.
This overly precautionary approach to radiation protection leads to
substantial economic expenditures for a minimal public health benefit
(Figure 2), and promotes public fear of radiation by fostering the idea
that any dose of radiation is potentially harmful. 1 7 For example, the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) set an individualprotection standard of 0.15 mSv/y in its final ruling on radiation
standards for Yucca Mountain. 1 8 There is little evidence that doses in
the range of natural background (approximately 1 mSv/y excluding
contributions from radon gas and its progeny) are harmful to the public
health or the environment. The EPA standard for Yucca Mountain is so
low that it is within the variation of natural background radiation levels
in the U.S.

17

Kenneth L. Mossman, Deconstructing Radiation Hormesis, 80 Health Physics 263

(2001).
18 United States Environmental Protection Agency, Public Health and Environmental
Radiation Protection Standardsfor Yucca Mountain, NV Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 32073,
32073-32135 (June 13, 2001).
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Figure2: Excessive Costs ofEnvironmental Cleanup
Environmental cleanup to levels below natural background (-1
mSv/y excluding radon) is extremely expensive. Economic costs for soil
19
cleanup at the Nevada Test Site are shown on the left ordinate.
Below 0.25 mSv/y, clean-up costs rise precipitously in spite of very
small theoretical reductions in lifetime radiogenic risk. Calculations of
theoretical lifetime radiogenic risks (right ordinate) are based on the
following assumptions: a linear no-threshold dose-response, a lifetime
cancer mortality risk of 5%/Sv, a seventy-year lifetime at a given annual
dose, and a dose rate effectiveness factor of two to account for dose
protraction.
Conclusion
In radiation safety, implementation of the precautionary principle is
unnecessary. Occupational and environmental radiation doses are well
known, as well as information about the public health risks. At doses
approximating natural background radiation levels (a few mSv/y), there
may be no health risks from radiation exposure. 2 0 One of the greatest
19 General Accounting Office, Scientific Basis Inconclusive, and EPA and NRC
Disagreement Continues (United States General Accounting Office 2000).
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ambiguities about the precautionary principle is the failure of its
advocates to specify what level of risk is acceptable. Given that every
product and human activity has the potential to create some risks,
criteria (e.g., acceptable risk thresholds) are necessary to limit its
applications to certain categories of risk. The alternatives are for the
precautionary principle to apply to every risk, which is both impractical
and imprudent, or for the principle to be applied in an arbitrary manner
to some risks.
The demarcation of an acceptable risk range to which the
precautionary principle does not apply would almost certainly exempt
many low-level radiation exposures from further concern. Uncoupling
radiation safety standards and practices from the precautionary
principle, and defining "acceptable risk," which is critical for evaluating
the need for recourse to the precautionary principle, would effectively
address two major interrelated problems plaguing nuclear technologies:
(1) economic costs associated with reduction of trivial risks; and (2) the
idea that any radiation dose is harmful.
We therefore suggest the following. First, professional scientific and
medical organizations such as the Health Physics Society, Radiation
Research Society, and the American College of Radiology should issue
official positions, preferably joint, defining an acceptable level of
radiation risk. Second, the U.S. government should revisit its
abandoned Below Regulatory Concern (BRC) policy. The federal
government attempted to define what an acceptable level of risk is
through a 1985 Congressional mandate to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) to establish a BRC policy. 2 1 The policy was to
establish a framework whereby the U.S. NRC would formulate rules or
make licensing decisions exempting from regulatory control those
practices that have such low estimated health risks that further
reduction of those risks would be unwarranted. In July 1990, NRC
established a BRC policy.2 2 Special interest groups opposed the policy
on the grounds that it would lead to uncontrolled release of large
20

According to the National Research Council's BEIR V Committee, at such low doses and
dose rates, the lower limit of the range of uncertainty in radiogenic risk estimates extends to
zero. National Research Council, Health Effects of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing
Radiation BEIR V (National Academy Press 1990).
21 Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99
Stat. 1842 (1985).
22 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Below Regulatory Concern, Policy statement, 55
Fed. Reg. 27522, 27522-27537 (1990).
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quantities of radioactive material. This view coupled with the lack of
consensus within the government regarding BRC risk levels ultimately
led to Congressional revocation of the BRC policy in 1992.23
Although there was some disagreement about BRC risk levels, federal
agencies and the technical community generally agreed that a BRCtype policy was a worthwhile concept for effectively allocating and
managing regulatory resources.

23

Energy Policy Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. § 2901 (1992).
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